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NOTES ON INFAXTRY TACTICS. 
l3y Licutcnant-Gcncral Sir W. J. WILLIIIIS, K.C.D., R.A. 
To the Secretary, Royal Uiriteil Sercice Imti&irt ioir .  
SIR, 
I DELIEVE that an Officer who is not accustomcd to manocuvrc an 
Arm cannot 'uo morc than nn amateur in its tactics. Ncrcrthelcss, I 
vcnturc to send you this lcttcr, bccansc i t  seems clear to xnc that thc 
principles on wliicli w e  found our infnntry drill for European war 
need rovision, and bcmnsc I S C C I I ~  to mysclf to know things mliicli 
ouglit to be takcn into account, wlicn thc drill is rcviscd. k'or tbc 
sako of clcarncss, and becanso I Iiavc no literary facility, I must write 
in a st$o moro didnctic than snbmissivc; but 1 do not mean to 
attcmpt to lay down tlic law. 
I beg Ica~c, thcn, to submit tho following propositions and 
rcmi ,1 *I* .s :- 
ProposXotis. 
I. I n  infantry against infantrx, it  is bcst to stand to win by press 
of nnmbcrs. 
11. A regular :Ittack or dcfcncc consists of thrcc Lines of equal 
strcrigtli on tlic propcr front of tlic Fixst Linc. 
111. 1x1 attack and dcfcnce, the First Linc is at thc bcginning divided 
into &'iring Linc, supports, arid rcscrrcs; thc Firing Linc a t  thc begin- 
ning is cxtcudcd to ninrk tho propcr front. 
IV. In attack nnd dcfcncc, the First Lixic rciuforccs thc Piring Linc ; 
tlic Second and Third Lines, each in its turn, rciriforcc thc Firing Linc, 
or partinlly rcinforce it, or givc i t  closc support ; a Firing I ino brought 
to n halt by tho firc of the enemy is in nccd of rcinforccmcnt. 
V. In  attack and dcfcncc, support should be ncarcr the Firing Linc 
than tlic Firing Linu is to tlie cncuiy. 
V1. Lixics iu attack bccomo irrcgiilar and swarm; somctliirig likc 
rcgular foruiation should bc kept up in tho Sccond andThird Lines as 
long as possible. 
VII. When two inf:intrics aro within charging distancc of encli 
otter, tlint infantry which c1i:irgcs is almost sure to win. 
l t e  m u  rks. 
I. Iu infantry against infantry, it is bcst to stand to win by press 
of numbers. 
This would seem to be an axiom, but IVO 1.1avc rcjcctcd it. Press of 
numbcis mcans tho pnshing on of many, not necessarily of snpcrior 
numbers, but of many men togctlicr. In  the advance, prcss of 
numbers makes tho mcn fccl that  there aro cnough of them to go on; 
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24 KOTES 0s ISFAXTRT TACTICS. 
nnd a t  tlic crisis, when within charging distancc, press of numbers 
induces them to charge. Tho 
line could cnrclop tho column with. fire and ruin it, 9” rcpulso the 
column by firo which made it halt and try in vain to deploy; but 
now, with line against line, therc can be no advantnge of firc to citlier 
side. We must try to win by prcss of numbers, that  is, by having 
moro men in fighting mood a t  the dccisivc time arid place. 
11. A regular attack or defence consists of three Lines of equal 
strengtli ou the propcr front of tho First Line. 
Thc number of Lines secms to be ruled by the numbcr of battalions 
in a foreign rcgimcnt. \Ye used to figlit in two Lines, and to win 
battles with line against colunin ; but now, whcn lines hare taken 
the place of columns, i t  would be better for  us not to figlit i n  two 
Lincs against three. Our attack of four battalions, with two i n  First 
of tlio Second Linc one iu rcar of the otlicr does not make Third 
Line. If we arc to harc four battalions in a brigadc, our regular 
attack and defence ouglit to be on tho propcr front of onc battalion; 
and the fourth battalion should bc licld in reserve, o r  rnanmuvro as a 
Fourth Line, or be told to guard a flank or both flanks, or bc scnt 
anywhcrc crcept into First Liuc. The proper front of infantry is thcir 
front in line with closed files. 
111. In attack and defcncc the First Linc is, n t  tho beginning, 
divided into Firing Line, supports, and reserves ; tlic Firing Line at 
thc beginiiing is extended to mark the p r o p  front. 
It is not for the safety of the men wlio arc tlicrc that thc Firing 
Line is cxtendcd at the beginning. For the safety of tlic i~hole  First 
Line, onlj  a fcw men nrc sent into the Firing Linc at  the beginning, 
and they being fcw arc estendcd to mark and cover tlic wliole front. 
Tlio diffcrcncc is important. Supposing that wliat IVC rainly imagine 
merc truc, that it would bc safer to extend, thc principlc of extonding 
for safetJ- could not bc carried out in attack. Howevcr littlc wo may 
know, i f  we only imagine the scene, we must refuse to belicvc that 
advancing in cxtcndcd ordcr is tlic way to bring mcn to the fron’t 
through fire. Fighting is not skirmishing : whcn inen in battlc arc 
out of hand of tlicir Officcrs, the Oficcrs aro not Oficcrs, nor arc the 
men soldiers. We havo to do a bard thing ; but whcn we plan how 
to do it, we must not seek safety until ~ v c  make tlie success of our 
entcrprisc almost impossiblc. \Vc half acknowledgo that, as thc 
danger in the Firing Lint3 increases, so thore must bc morc rncn there 
to  111akc the Line advance; let us fullr ndmit that nccessitj-, and think 
what tlie admission means ; and thcn let us go fairly on, nnd admit: 
to ourselves tlint our wholo attack is weak through our  fault of 
thinking too much of horn to ndvancc with less loss. \Ve havo come 
to D liccncc of cxtcnding: tlic men are scattcrcd and out of hand, and 
our strength is wwtcd. We can liars no proper battlc drill until KO 
cease to extend for snfcty. 
LV. In  attackand defcncc thcFirst Linc reinforces the Firing Liuc : 
tho Sccond and Third Lines, each in its turn, reinforce the Firing Line, 
or partially rcinforcc it, or giro it close support: a Firing Linc 
A lino could beat a column by firc. 
Linc, is really only an attack in two Lines ; placing tlic twolntt. 6 1  1‘ 1011s 
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XOTES 0s IXFASTl1T TACTICS. 25 
brought to a halt by tlic fire of thc cnciiir is in nccd of rciiiforcc- 
mcnt. 
A t  drill and mauamvrcs our &'iring Lincsadranx, lio down and fire, 
advnncc again without rcinforccmcnt, W l i n t  does that roprc- 
scllt ? Do they lio down to be savcd from fatigue in L long advance 
llndci. firc, or to firc at tlic cncmy, orbccnusc t h y  arc brought to D, 
I d t  by tlic firo of the encmy 3 An attacking Firing Linc ought to 
ndoalicc whcn i t  can: when i t  halts, it imnts rcinforccment; and 
during its waits for reixiforccmcnt i t  can firc on tho encmg. A Firing 
Line ought xieycr to be lialtcd by ordcr to firc : it will halt without 
orders, mid f;rc wlicii haltcd. Tlic principlc ought to bc acknow- 
ledged that a Piriug IAic which halts iu its advance is in need of rc- 
iriforcemcnt. Rciniorccmciit, 01' tho closc ~rpproach OE support, incites 
a lialtcd lino to rcncw its ndvaucc. If, by drilling to that, wc should 
ruxi tlic risk of tidii1ig away from tlic dash of our  iufantry in ;ittack, 
011 tho othci. hand it is plain that, by iiot drilling piapcrly, wc fail to 
instruct in their duty nll Officers and men in  rear of tho Firing Linc. 
'L'licrc is dangcr in makirig bclicvc that our wcak attack is tlic ~ a y  
to figlit. As yet w c  know that what wc tcacli is not true; bat wc 
arc bcginning to losc sight of tho truth. 
V. In ntt:ick and dcfcncc, support sliould be nearcr thc Firing liinc 
than tlic Firiug Line is to tlic cncmy. 
If thc approach to the position of thc cncmy wcrc commanded by 
his firc, the distanco bctrvecn Lines at thc beginning would bc ruled 
by tho Icugth of battalion columns of routc. Sorric OIIiccrs tliink 
that Linc distancc should bo ninnagcd so that  firc aimcd a t  ouc Lino 
might not striko anothcr. This vagyo rulu mould pcrhaps give tho 
samo rcsult as if battalions formed lino to tlic front from column of 
routc. Ccrtainly, from tlic beginning until closc support is wanted, 
ouc Linc ought not to bc so near as to intcrfcrd with tho working of 
nnotlicr; also, a Line ought from tho bcgirining to bc within fair 
supporting distnncc of its Linc ncst in front; and, again, on account 
of the fire of thc cncmy, it i ~ o n l d  bc well not to put Lipcs unncccsarily 
closc togcther. Tltcsc considerations sccm to point io n Lino distancc 
of SO0 to 400 yards. Line distance would bo gradually lcsscnecl until 
thc last rcscrrcs of thc First Lino wcre going into thc Firing Linc ; but 
thcn, unless tlic Sccond Lino wcro :ilrcady far  enough to tho front, it 
must morc up quickly, not nccessirily into closo support, but SO 
as to bc rcady to girc tho First Linc closc support, or to rcinforco 
it, or partially rcinforcc it; and, a t  tho samo timc, the Tliircl Lino 
must mom up so as to bc ready to Lakc tlio place of tho Sccon4 Linc 
in closc support. Closc support Line distanco in infantry is pcrhzps 
50 J-ards. A supporting Linc ought not to comc into close support 
until the Firing Line is within, or nearly within, charging distancc of 
tlic cncmy; but, beforo tho battlc is so far advanced, tho supporting 
Lirio may harc to rcinforcc tlic Firing Linc, o r  partiallj roinforce it. 
Charging distancc is pcrliaps rztlicr undcr thaii owr 100 yards. Linu 
distaiice, and closiiig up of Lines, have licrchccn considered as if tho 
battle-ficld were :I plain. Wlicn it might wcll bcdone, tho threo Linw 
of attack \i.ould bc brought togethcr before tho Firing Lino wcnt out; 
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26 KOTES 0s LVFSVTRT TACTICS. 
aiid, in defence, tlio Sccond and Third Lincs would bc brought up to 
tho rcscrvcs of tlic First ; and, both in  attack and dcfcncc, distanccs 
\vould 11o lcsscncd, or brought to nothing, to tako adrantagc of 
accidents of ground. Tho gciicral rulc for support is that support 
should be nearcr tlio Firing Lino than the Firing Linc ia to tho 
cncniy. 
VI. Lines i n  attnck bccomc irrcgulnr, arid swarm : somcthing like 
rcgu1:rr formation should be kcpL up in thc Sccond and Third Lincs as  
long as possible. 
Thc Firing Linc, rundo up by nggrcgotion of reinforccmcnts, and 
winning its way as pnrts of tlic Line arc incitcd to advance, is from 
tlie beginning a lino only in namc. Thc Sccond and Tliixd Lincs lose 
tlicir two-dccp formation, nnd bcgiri to swarm a t  intcrrnls; but tlic 
succcss of tlic nttacli clcpcnds upon somc regularity of formation bcing 
kept in  tlicse Lincs, and thc mcu thorc rcmaining in hand of tlicir 
Ofiiccrs. Wicn  thc E’irst Liiic, a11 in tlic Firing Linc, is within cliarging 
distancc of tlic cncrny, i t  i3 tlic Secoiid Linc, coming up in somcthing 
likc ivgulnr formation, which incitcs the First Linc to c h n ~ p ;  or, as i t  
is niorc likcly it will conic to pass, i f  tlic Secoud Linc lias rcinforccd 
tlic Kist bcforo coming witliin clmrging distaiicn, or tlic Pirst and 
Sccond Lincs togctlicr 1iavo failod to cli:irgc,it is tho Third Liuc,coxning 
iip witli sonio rcgularity of formation, which givcs tlic swarm in front 
tlic impulsc wanted. A swarm all out  of liaiid of its Ofliccrs mq-, a t  
lnst, without rciiifox~cnicnt o r  support, be incited to chnrgc through 
consciousness of its strength in num’ucrs and by inipaticncc of tlw 
situation ; bni, such incitcmcnt may not cotnc, :~nd tho cnemy may 
charge. 
VII. Wlien two infantrics arc within cliargiiig di;stancc of cncli 
otlicr, that infantry which chnrgcs is almost sure to \VIII. 
Dnngcr 
tires tho minds of nicxi whom it docs not cralt. Fern of tho Firing 
IJinc, 011 citlier sidc, will bc inclincd to chnrgc. Wlicn both sidcs aro 
lyinz on thc ground, cnch firing orcr tlic otlicr, and no rcinforccmcnt 
conics, i t  is perhaps tlic hardest thing in war for cithcr sidc to risp 
and clinrgc. 31cn who arc not conscious of bciiig strong iu numbcrs 
mill not charge; it is N O ~ C  likcly that tlio incitcmcrit will conic to tlic 
nttnck thau to thc dcfcncc; tlio sidc wliicli numbers lcss may chnrgc; 
citlicr sidc may charge, but the side xliich chargcs will almost siircly 
win. 
Geiieral Remarks. 
’ Tnfnntry in  tlic opcn will mrcly, if ercr, cross bajoncts. 
1. Linc is tlio piopcr b:ittlo formation-line two dccp ivitli closcd 
filcs, or tho thing most likc it wc cnii liarc. Wc must not cstciid, 
nor :&axice in sin& rank. Wc slioiild shut out 0111’ artillery, or 
soffcr too much fiam its firn; wo sliould bc too weak on our front; 
our mcn would bo scattcrcd and out of hand ; and our atiack would 
wasto awaj-, :tnd stop of itsclf, bcfoiu: it canio to tho cncmy. The 
claiiger of moving lincs ovcr a country lins bccri uincli cxaggcratcd. 
It is usclcss to considcr \vlicther e drill which is impracticable would 
bc safcr. 
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SOTES OX INb’A?r’TRT TACTICS. 27 
2. TVllethcr a battalion lint could advanco in  battlc under ~ i i ~  
command, likc a line of battcrics or squadrons, 01’ wlicthcr tho 
ndrancc could only bc niadc indcpcndcntly by conipnnics ; wvkcthei*, 
in &\v of licepirig tlic mcn in hand i n  battle, thc company ought to 
bc a t  all timcs a more distinct and important komInand;, and, iii view 
of advancing in battalion h e  in battle, or of maintaining Latt:ilioii 
unity of command in battle, how many companies there should be in 
a battalion-thew arc questions which an  Oficcr not brought u11 in 
tllc infantry can only submit. 
Gzc er nsey, 
Octolm 30, 1892 
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